trod ct o
Most new rms are spawned by existing rms (Campbell et al., 2012Y Sørenson and Fassiotto, 2011) . Moreover, new rm founders rarely venture out alone, and often rely on former coworkers to set up a team (Agarwal et al., 201SY Groysberg et al., 200V) . That was the case of Inter-rm labor mobility has been investigated by scholars from di¤erent elds (including economics, human resource management, strategic management, and sociology), and its e¤ects on key organizational outcomes (e.g., innovation, learning, productivity, survival) is strongly We address these gaps by building and testing a theory on the role of coworker mobility in the survival of pushed (or necessity-driven) and pulled (or opportunity-driven) employee startups.
Our study builds on the extensive research on spin-o¤s and on two emerging, yet separate, streams of work: a rst one investigating hiring choices in startup rms (Coad et al., 201RY Dahl and u lepper, 201SY Ouimet and arutskie, 201R), and a second one acknowledging the di¤erent contexts surrounding spin-o¤ activity (e.g., Bruneel et al., 201QY Buenstorf, 200WY Rocha et al., 201Sa, 201Sb) .
To test our hypotheses, we use a rich matched employer-employee dataset virtually covering all the private rms employing at least one wage earner in Portugal. Empirically, we adopt a novel methodology and estimate a three-stage model that addresses two important empirical issues often neglected in prior studies, which bias the estimated e¤ects of (co)worker mobility in the context of newly founded rms: self-selection into entrepreneurship and endogeneity in 1 The story of ¡ ¢ £ ¤ on ¥ ¡ ¢ £ ¤ on and its people is available at www.kilmerhouse.com (see http:GG¦¦¦ §¨ilmerhouse §©¡GGG-years-ago-e¤-woodohnson-arrives-in-new-brunswic¨Gk § foundershiring choices. Our data o¤er a great potential to study labor mobility issues in the context of entrepreneurship, allowing the identication of both entrepreneurs and employees, as well as their prior interactions in work-related networks (Campbell, 200 ) . Moreover, Portugal constitutes an interesting setting to be studied, given the growing number of pushed and pulleddriven startups established over the 1!!0s and 2000s, and the rigidity of the labor market which may have important implications in entrepreneursearly recruitment decisions and future performance of new ventures.
Our study contributes to prior research on labor mobility and entrepreneurship by investigating a particular kind of labor mobility coworkers co-moving with spin-o¤ founders in a new, and comparative, context pushed and pulled spin-o¤s. This work has important implications for broader theories on the role of labor mobility in organizational outcomes of arrival rms, and also for developing theories on labor markets for entrepreneurship. It also constitutes an important step towards unpacking the mechanisms through which mobile human capital a¤ects the performance of receiving rms.
In what follows, we develop the theoretical framework and the hypotheses. We then present the data and methodology, followed by a brief description of the spin-o¤ activity and coworker mobility in our setting. Finally, we present our ndings, and discuss their implications for theory, practice, and policy.
eoret ca ra ewor a d y ot eses
Spin-o¤ activity is, itself, a labor mobility process, and has been the focus of most literature connecting entrepreneurship and labor mobility issues (Audretsch and " eibach, 200#$ Campbell et al., 2012) . Despite the importance of employment mobility for management theory and practice, we still lack a thorough understanding of this phenomenon in di¤erent contexts triggering new venture creation.
We integrate the insights from existing research on spin-o¤s which has generally addressed mobility at the level of the founder, and in contexts of voluntary (e.g., opportunity-driven) mobility with two related, but still developing, streams of analysis: hiring choices in startups and the context triggering new venture creation. The integration of these research strands will form the basis for the development of our hypotheses.
owor er ob ty a d ost e try s r a o s o s
The widespread research on inter-rm labor mobility has demonstrated that mobile employees represent potential sources of knowledge, competencies, information, and routines that benet the performance of receiving rms (e.g., Bidwell and % eller, 201&' Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012' Song et al., 200() . Team, rm, industry, and regional-specic knowledge can, therefore, move across rm boundaries (Agarwal et al., 200&' Franco and Filson, 2006) and endow the receiving rms with valuable and non-imitable resources. Learning by hiring theories, indeed, postulate that rms can learn from workers)experiences with prior employers (Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012' Song et al., 200() , which make human capital a strategic resource, and recruitment a strategy in itself (Phillips and Gully, 2010' Wright et al., 201&) .
In the context of startup rms, early recruitment choices are among the most critical decisions for organizational success and survival (Campbell, 2000) . The r owever, the early hiring decisions of startups will likely inuence their performance, and will be di¢ cult to emulate or change when a rm is older (Geroski et al., 2010 ' Rocha et al., 2016 .
Most new ventures are founded by prior employees, and work histories may provide key resources such as human and social capital for prospective entrepreneurs (Burton et al., 2002' S2renson and Fassiotto, 2011) . While a wide literature has studied the formation of spin-o¤s as a particular form of labor mobility, through which knowledge may be transferred from a parent company to a new rm (Agarwal et al., 200&' Campbell et al., 2012 ' Dahl and Sorenson, 201&' Franco and Filson, 2006 ' % lepper and Thompson, 2010 , very few studies have looked at labor mobility phenomena beyond the startup founder (see Boschma et al., 2003 ' Agarwal et al., 2010 .
Still, founders rarely venture out on their own, often turning to their colleagues to assemble a team (Agarwal et al., 2010 ' Groysberg et al., 2004 . Given their lack of experience and resources, the ma5ority of newly established ventures do not (yet) have formal human resources strategies and, instead, rely on informal recruitment channels to attract employees to their organizations (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) . r iring former coworkers is, therefore, one of their natural alternatives (Nziali and Fayolle, 201&) . Brymer et al. (201&) propose pipelines as a sta¢ ng practice that rms (including newly ( founded ventures) use to cope with many challenges that labor markets present, such as information asymmetries, applicant scarcity, and costly mis-hires. By using a6 nity groups, social ties, and7or existing organizations (that already did the necessary screening among employees) as pipelines through which they ac9uire most of their human resources, rms may better deal with the uncertainty in the labor market, reduce the searching and integration costs that are inherent in human capital ac9uisition, and circumvent situations of adverse selection (Bidwell and @ eller, 201AB Dahl and Sorenson, 201A) . This may be especially relevant in new and small rms, where hiring costs can still be substantial (Blatter et al., 2012) .
It can, hence, be argued that hiring former coworkers may result in greater stability and predictability of a rmCs stock of skills and capabilities, better coordination and control, enhanced socialization, and lower transaction costs (Lepak and Snell, 1DDD). By having shared some experiences in the parent rm, the presence of coworkers in the initial workforce can also foster trust, enhance communication, e6 ciency, and cooperation among team members (Groysberg et al., 200EB Leana and Van Buren, 1DDD) .
Former coworkers are, therefore, believed to be a source of human and relational capital (Nziali and Fayolle, 201A) . Besides the knowledge, skills, and expertise gained through education and training, former coworkers bring also team-specic capital built through close working relationships at the parent rm. Some components of human capital are likely to be lost once individuals change employers, namely colleague-and team-specic components (Campbell et al., 201A) . The co-mobility of founders and former coworkers mitigates this risk, and the relational capital embodied in the team (e.g., shared values, ties, and language) makes, furthermore, the human resources of the new venture uni9ue and di6 cult to imitate (Lepak and Snell, 1DDD), and increases the potential for knowledge transfer (Mawdsley and Somaya, 201F).
For those reasons, employee startups are expected to benet from coworker mobility, and to over-perform those spin-o¤s that do not rely on this pool of human resources. Nonetheless, this recruitment strategy is not necessarily an un9ualied positive. Overreliance on former coworkers when setting up the initial team may create some lock-in problems, if the inHows of skills resemble those already present in the plant (e.g., in the founder), and may lock-out potentially more 9 ualied candidates who are strangersto the founder (Boschma et al., 200DB Brymer et al., 201A) . Including former coworkers in new organizational teams may, besides, be driven by foundersChomophily preferences and strong ties (Ruef et al., 200I) , which has potential costs, such as organizational inertia, lack of innovation and creativity, with implications for rmCs ability to adapt to environmental changes and shocks (Brymer et al., 201AB Leana and Van Buren, 1DDDB Lepak and Snell, 1DDD) . Dense and long-standing ties among some organizational members may also raise the risk of undesired collusions among employees (Baron and @ reps, 1DDD). Last but not least, founders attracting former coworkers likely face a trade-o¤ between the benets of accessing to a pipeline of workers with valuable knowledge and experience, and the costs of labor poaching, which may include higher wage bills to attract workers from incumbent rms, and competitive reactions from poached rms (Combes and Duranton, 2006P PeTer and X eil,
201`).
We expect, even so, that the benets more than compensate the possible costs of coworker mobility, especially in the context of newly founded startups fraught by uncertainty, information asymmetries, and hiring costs that can be detrimental to their survival (Blatter et al., 2012) .
The benets of using pipeline recruitment strategies are also expected to be amplied in smaller hiring rms, with narrowly focused human capital sources (Brymer et al., 201a) . Therefore, we hypothesize that:
The presence of former coworkers in the initial workforce reduces spin-o¤ exit risk.
We acknowledge, however, that coworker mobility may have some downsides, and so we conduct post-hoc analyses to investigate this.
ar y r dec s o s co te t: s ed a d ed dr e star t s
When hiring mobile individuals, destination rms are ultimately interested in specic attributes of the potential employeeTs human and relational capital that they anticipate will provide value.
The impact of labor mobility on organizational outcomes is, then, likely to vary on the basis of contextual factors such as attributes of the employee, source, and destination rms that may moderate the transfer and utilization of human and relational capital held by mobile individuals (Mawdsley and Somaya, 201f) .
The context where spin-o¤s emerge is a topic of increasing discussion in the literature, since not all spin-o¤s arise from the identication of a business opportunity. Red and Skogstrm, 201wp von Grei¤, 200q) under a larger (time and nancial) pressure than more opportunity-based entrepreneurs, who possibly had more time to think and decide about the creation of their own business. Furthermore, the longer the period spent in unemployment, the larger the labor market penalties afterwards (e.g., wage penalties and decreased chance of nding a new ob), and the higher the risk of human capital depreciation (Baptista et al., 201wp uttunen et al., 2011) , which increases the urgency in the decision making.
This pressure is likely to inuence hiring decisions in pushed and pulled spin-o¤s. The more time is spent searching for a suitable employee, the higher the costs incurred, but the better the expected match.
owever, given the higher degree of urgency in pushed-driven startups, they often cannot a¤ord to hold out for long in the hope of nding the most suitable employees.
Pushed spin-o¤s may, therefore, be expected to compromise the x uality of their early hires for speed of hiring. Relying on former coworkers whose competences and skills are already known by founders may help compensating this liability.
Nevertheless, startups typically have a hard time to attract top employees (Coad et al., 201wp Dahl and lepper, 201i) , and the fewer assets a rm owns in early stages, the more di cult is to attract x ualied labor. Even though steeper earning proles may be achieved later on by those employees progressing through a small growing rm, the risk of involuntary displacement due to startup failure is higher, and initial wages tend to be lower than in established, more mature, and less cash-constrained rms (Campbell, 200, 201) .
This may create further constraints to early-stage entrepreneurs, who might have to pay a higher wage bill in order to compensate new hires for the risk of being employed in a rm with a higher hazard. These costs are, however, expected to be relatively lower in spin-o¤s originating from closed or declining parent rms: not only are they less exposed to the risk of competitive reactions from poached parent rms, as it may also be easier for them to attract former (displaced) coworkers at a relatively lower cost, in case they do not have any better immediate alternative in the labor market that prevents the depreciation of their competencies.
iring former coworkers may, accordingly, fulll a much greater advantage for pushed spino¤s compared to their pulled-driven counterparts. We therefore hypothesize that:
The negative e¤ect of coworker mobility on spin-o¤ exit risk is larger in pushed-driven spin-o¤s than in pulled-driven spin-o¤s. Åstebro et al., 2011) . In our context, these results suggest that spin-o¤ founders are a nonrandom sample of employees from parent rms, but a self-selected group of individuals who may base their decision on their ability or innate talent, which is unobservable to us.
Additionally, both seminal (Lucas, 1stu) and more recent studies (Agarwal et al., 201vw Baptista et al., 201xw Dahl and y lepper, 201v) document that the most able entrepreneurs are likely to attract more and better (e.g., more skilled) employees. Consezuently, early hires tend to be allocated to rms according to founders{ability, and the best founders may strategically assemble teams that represent strong complementarities. Again, this implies that, in our context, the decision of hiring former coworkers may be strongly correlated with unobservable traits of spin-o¤ founders, which makes coworker mobility potentially endogenous to spin-o¤ survival.
Our empirical approach addresses these two issues. We acknowledge those earlier results, and adopt a recent methodology (see Roodman, 2011 ) that allows the Entries of new rms are identied by the rst year a rm is recorded in QP les. Firm exit is identied by the moment when a rm stops answering the survey. Following previous studies that also use QP dataset (e.g., Geroski et al., 2010 Mata and Portugal, 2002) , we have reuired an absence of the rm from the les larger or eual to two years in order to identify its denite exit.
Our analysis focuses on startups founded (in J) by individuals (or teams of founders) who were in paid employment before (in J0 or J0 ) in incumbent rms. We follow the same denition of spin-o¤s (or spin-outs) adopted in prior studies also using matched employer-employee data (e.g., We identify a total of 2, new startups whose founders were in paid employment before rm creation. We refer to the previous employer as the parent rm throughout the analysis.
Out of these, 1,22 startups were founded by individuals who left a parent rm that was declining or that denitely closed down in the same year they were employed there for the last time.
We classify this group of startups as pushed spin-o¤s. The remaining 1,1 startups were founded by individuals who were previously employed in incumbent rms that continued operating after their exit. A likely reason for their exit might have been the identication of an entrepreneurial opportunity, so we classify them as pulled spin-o¤s. Figure 2 depicts the positive evolution in the number of pushed and pulled-driven spin-o¤s in the Portuguese private sector. All these rms employ at least one wage employee since their entry. The numbers show that pushed-driven startups deserve further attention, given that the number of new spin-o¤s triggered by necessity was higher than the startup activity driven by opportunity identication in most of the years. We also observe relatively more prominent startup activity in periods of economic downturn (e.g., 1, early 2000s, and the years preceding the global nancial crisis of the late 2000s), which may indicate that entrepreneurship is chosen by disproportionately more individuals in times of crisis, not only for necessity reasons, but also due to the identication of new market opportunities. Portugal, thus, o¤ers an interesting context to be studied, considering the growing number of new startups being created over time (and the relatively large number of pushed-driven rms), as well as the specicities of its labor Most of these pushed startups (10, in total) have origin in rms that denitely closed down before spin-o¤ creation. The remaining founders come from incumbent rms that su¤ered massive downsizing (higher than with a minimum of ve displacements) and that closed down within one or two years. The possibility that some of these spin-o¤s are a restructuration of closed parent rms is ruled out by excluding startups whose initial workers have a tenure larger than 2 months in the year of entry. Our sample is also unlikely to include new rms resulting from mergers or ns, as less than of rm closures in Portugal are caused by ¡ £ ¤ (Geroski et al., 2010) . Both aspects reinforce that the displacements identied in our data are exogenous.
at the parent rm right before spin-o¤ creation. Our nal pool of employees includes 1,1ª6,0«¬ individuals, out of which 2® were employed in declining incumbent rms that closed down in the same year or within two years at most (see Figure¯). About 6® of them became entrepreneurs (business owners) after leaving the rm, some of them in teams, thus sharing the ownership of the new business.°As expected, the proportion of workers in other (surviving and non-declining) incumbent rms who started their own venture is much lower (1.ª®), as their opportunity costs of leaving wage employment are naturally higher.
We also identify a considerable number of employees moving out of the parent rm and being hired by spin-o¤s in the year of their creation, whom we refer to as The main goal of our empirical analysis is to study how coworker mobility a¤ects spin-o¤ survival (µypothesis 1), and how di¤erent is the e¤ect for pushed and pulled spin-o¤s (µypothesis 2). As previously discussed, two empirical issues must be addressed in order to study the causal e¤ects of coworker mobility on spin-o¤ outcomes: rst, self-selection e¤ects in entrepreneurship entry, and, second, endogeneity in the founders ¶ decision of hiring coworkers. We, therefore, frame our empirical analysis in a three-stage model, and simultaneously estimate the three (binary) recursive outcomes: 1) entrepreneurial entry· 2) founders ¶decision of hiring previous coworkers· and¸) spin-o¤ survival. Not all employees in the parent rm decide to become entrepreneurs and found their own business. As a result, the second and third outcomes are only observed among those who actually made the decision of leaving the parent rm to spin-out. While this group of individuals may be a non-random sample of employees, their unobserved attributes e.g., ability may also drive their hiring decisions once they engage in startup activity, and ¹ ointly a¤ect their performance later on. Neglecting these aspects is likely to bias the core e¤ect of interest: the impact of coworker mobility on spin-o¤ survival.
The three stages of our model are illustrated in Figure   º . To allow for the ¹ oint estimation of these three stages, we tested our hypothesized e¤ects with robust maximum likelihood estimation in a simultaneous e»uation model with correlated error terms, as proposed by Roodman (2011).
The system corresponds to a multi-e»uation probit model, also containing a wage in the parent rm. We also include the number of di¤erent rms where the individual was employed to capture the diversity of their labor market experience, which was earlier shown to in¿uence entrepreneurial choices (e.g., Rocha et al., 201Àc) . As measures of specic human capital, we consider their tenure (in months) in the parent rm, the experience (in years) in the industry, and the accumulated experience in management and business ownership positions (also in years). Regarding parent rm characteristics, we consider rm size (number of employees) and whether the individual was employed in a declining or closing parent rm (to distinguish between necessity and opportunity-driven entrepreneurial decisions). We then control for several contextual factors, namely the industry and region of the parent rm, and the macroeconomic environment (by including year dummies).
The second stage eÁuation hiring previous coworkers includes the same set of variables mentioned above, now observed only for those who became founders of new rms. Furthermore, it includes a set of indicator variables to distinguish between spin-o¤s founded i) in the same or in a di¤erent Â -digit industry as the parent rm, ii) in the same or in a di¤erent location (municipality) as the parent rm, iii) by a single founder or a team of two or more founders coming from the same parent rm (shared ownership). These startup conditions are also expected to inÃuence the decision of hiring former coworkers. This second eÁuation also includes entry year and industry dummies to control for di¤erences in coworker recruitment choices over time and across industries.
The nal stage spin-o¤ survival will allow us testing the validity of our hypotheses.
Coworker mobility, already modeled in the second stage, is one key explanatory variable of spin-o¤ survival. The coeÄ cient obtained for this variable will provide the basis for testing our AE ypothesis 1. Spin-o¤ type pushed versus pulled will also be included in the set of explanatory variables, given the growing debate about performance gaps between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s The estimations will be cluster-adÎusted to further account for non-independence of the observations of employees working in the same parent rm. Finally, though Wilde (2000) shows that a general (recursive) multi-eÁuation probit model is identied as long as each eÁuation contains one varying predetermined variable, as in our case, we include some exclusion restrictions to improve identication. We augment the rst stage (selection) eÁuation and introduce the entry rate of new rms in the municipality in the previous year, as a proxy of the entrepreneur-ial environment in each narrow region. While this variable is believed (and shown) to a¤ect employeesÏentrepreneurial propensity, it is exogenous to the foundersÏfuture decision of hiring coworkers from the parent rm. We additionally included two other variables in the secondstage eÐuation that are found to be signicant predictors of the decision of hiring coworkers, but not signicant predictors of spin-o¤ survival the proportion of skilled and unskilled (low skilled, unskilled, trainees, and apprentices) workers employed at the parent rm, before spin-o¤ creation. The skill composition of the overall workforce at the parent rm proxies the availability of human resources that might be of interest of spin-o¤ founders, which is likely to a¤ect foundersÏ probability of hiring former coworkers, being exogenous to the survival prospects of new ventures.
s ed a d ed s o act ty a d cowor er o b ty: A descr t o
Before presenting the results and testing our hypotheses, this section provides a brief description of our sample and documents some individual-level di¤erences that will be taken into account in the estimations. Besides examining whether there is any survival bonus in hiring former coworkers, we also brieÑy describe who spins-o¤ and who hires former coworkers.
s ed a d ed s o s r a w e cowor ers do ot co o e Figure   Ò illustrates the survivor functions of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, with and without coworkers in their initial workforce. These rst statistics suggest that spin-o¤s with coworkers survive relatively longer. Unconditionally (i.e., without controlling for any (un)observed characteristics of entrepreneurs and rms), pushed spin-o¤s seem actually to survive longer than their pulled counterparts, which may be mostly driven by the fact that they rely on former coworkers more often (e.g., Rocha et al., 201Òb) . Raw survival rates show that the share of pushed startups surviving during the studied period is 6ÒÓ among those hiring coworkers and , which indicates that coworker mobility may, indeed, bring larger survival benets to pushed-driven spin-o¤s, given the relatively more uncertain conditions and larger pressure under which they are established.
We must, still, be aware that spin-o¤ founders even those driven by necessity may be a selection of employees with di¤erent characteristics. Table A .I in the Appendix).
Þ Þ Þ Figure 6 here
The opposite association is found in coworker mobility, which is indicative that coworkers absorbed by new spin-o¤s belong to a group of less skilled employees at the parent rm. While this may be, indeed, the case in pushed-driven startups, pulled-driven founders may be in a better position to attract some of the best employees in the parent rm (see Figure 6 and the ã This xed-e¤ects wage ä å ae ç è é on was estimated using the procedure described in ê ae é ë ç ì í es and Portugal (2010), and all the history we have for each individual in the labor market. The dependent variable was dened as the real hourly earnings (in logs). This wage eåuation controlled for individaeçîïs age ( 
1Ù
person xed e¤ect of coworkers, compared to other workers in each group of parent rms).
These entrepreneurs are more skilled on average, they may have identied a protable market opportunity, and they are probably less restricted (e.g., nancially) than their necessity-driven counterparts. This points out that the intentions of pushed and pulled founders when hiring coworkers may be di¤erent, and that coworker mobility may not necessarily a¤ect the survival of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s through the same mechanisms.
o res or er cowor ers
We, therefore, further analyze how di¤erent are spin-o¤ founders according to their decision of hiring former coworkers. A brief comparison between founders hiring and not hiring coworkers is available in Table A .II (Appendix). To better understand the di¤erent prole of these two groups of founders, we estimated the second stage of the model the decision of hiring coworkers ÷ ointly with the rst-stage decision of entering entrepreneurship (self-selection eùuation), using the aforementioned method of Roodman (2011). The results (in Table A .III in the Appendix)
show that the decision of hiring coworkers is not random, but negatively correlated with the unobservable traits that may drive individuals into entrepreneurship, such as ability or risk taking preferences (rho ú -0.û22ü). This indicates that founders employing former colleagues are a negative selection of all the entrepreneurs in our sample who, themselves, are a positive selection of all the employees in the parent rm (as illustrated in Figure 6 ). The more experienced and educated they are, the lower their propensity to absorb labor from the parent rm. This result hints that founders recruiting from their network may decide to do so to compensate any relative disadvantage in skills, knowledge, or experience. This also reinforces that hiring coworkers is endogenous and driven by foundersýunobservable characteristics that are likely to a¤ect spin-o¤ performance.
es ts owor er ob ty a d s o s r a Table 2 reports the results obtained for spin-o¤ exit risk and provide the basis for testing our theoretical hypotheses. The rst two columns provide the baseline results obtained with the simple estimation of a probit model for the probability of rm exit, neglecting the issues of selfselection and endogeneity in coworker mobility previously discussed. We address these concerns in the last two columns, by simultaneously estimating the three-stage model described earlier. r owever, there might be a trade-o¤ in starting a rm with a skilled and experienced set of workers: though human capital may endow startups with a competitive advantage, it also implies higher labor costs in early stages, in order to attract, retain, and compensate better works for the risk of working in startups. Our results indicate that the latter e¤ect prevails in our sample of spin-o¤s.
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Those who share the business ownership with other founder(s) are more likely to survive, as they possibly also share risks and nancial assets. New ventures established in larger urban areas may face higher competition, which increases their exit risk. Startup size is inversely (though weakly) related to exit risk, while parent rm size seems to play an important role, as spin-o¤s originating from smaller parent rms survive longer. Though this is apparently conicting with the idea that better parent rms (which are typically assumed to correspond to larger incumbent rms) produce more successful spin-o¤s, this result is in line with the literature documenting 6 Similar conclusions are obtained if we use the average wage of the initial workforce instead of average age and education of workers. ¡ wever, given some missing values in wages in startup rms in the rst year of activity, we would lose a considerable number of observations. that smaller rms provide a better context for employees to learn from other entrepreneurs and to succeed in their own entrepreneurial rms later on (e.g., 
¦
We next conduct some post-hoc analyses in order to better understand the (di¤erent) value that former coworkers can add to pushed and pulled-driven startups.
ost oc a a yses
Two main mechanisms were theoretically advanced along the development of our hypotheses:
former coworkers may transfer knowledge that increases the survival prospects of the new rm, and they may also reduce labor searching costs and consequently reduce spin-o¤ exit risk. We now investigate how empirically relevant they are in our data. First, we extend the last stage of the multi-equation system in order to test how pushed and pulled spin-o¤sexit risk is a¤ected by coworkersgeneral and specic knowledge, and by labor adjustment costs at the rm-level.
Second, we analyze how coworker mobility impacts on other spin-o¤ outcomes in later stages. Table§ summarizes the results obtained for spin-o¤ exit, when including measures of coworkersgeneral and specic knowledge, and labor adjustment costs. To account for industry-and region-specic knowledge embodied in these mobile employees, we consider the relative importance of coworkers with former experience in the same region or industry where the spin-o¤ is founded (i.e., their share in the initial workforce). As a proxy of coworkersgeneral knowledge and ability, we include the hourly wage they earned in the parent rm before moving to the startup.¨Finally, in order to measure the costs incurred with recruitment and adjustments in the workforce in early stages, we add the turnover in the workforce at the end of the rst year of activity (the sum of hiring and separation rates at the rm-level).
©
Our results are robust to several alternative specications and sub-samples. Using the share of coworkers in the initial workforce, or the number of coworkers, instead of the binary decision of hiring (versus not hiring) any coworkers produces the same ualitative results. The main results are also consistent when we look at particular sub-samples of spin-o¤s (e.g., spin-o¤s founded by a single founder versus teams of two or more founder, spino¤s established in manufacturing versus services), where knowledge transfer mechanisms could have a di¤erent relative importance. These results will be available upon reuest.
As an alternative measure of coworkeability we used their average person xed e¤ect. Most results were tatively similar to those in Table   1 ! " " " Table   # here " " "
The results support that the presence of former coworkers benets the longevity prospects of both types of spin-o¤s ($1), though the e¤ects are stronger for pushed-driven startups, as previously hypothesized ($2). In the case of pushed spin-o¤s, the survival gain resulting from coworker mobility is higher when they rely relatively more on former colleagues coming from the same region where the rm is created. The literature on labor mobility and local labor markets establishes that distance acts as a mobility barrier and increases rm searching costs may decrease the costs of hiring labor. This may be especially relevant in startups founded in more adverse conditions, which may need to setup an initial workforce relatively faster and at a lower price than more opportunity-driven startups, in order to survive. Besides making the recruitment easier and less costly, these coworkers may also bring specic knowledge about the region (e.g., contacts of customers and suppliers), which may be particularly important for new entrepreneurs triggered by necessity.
In contrast, pulled spino¤s are found to benet less from coworkers when they come from the same industry and region. First, the costs of labor poaching and of competitive reactions (e.g., rivalry and retaliation) by parent rms are expected to be higher in that case. Second, these results further suggest that pulled spin-o¤s benet more from workers conveying new knowledge to the rm (see Timmermans and Boschma, 201(). The results furthermore show that coworkers'average ) uality is only a signicant determinant of survival in pulled-driven startups. This may indicate that hiring former coworkers may improve productivity and knowledge transfer to a higher extent in pulled spin-o¤s, which may be more able to attract better ) uality workers (cf. Figure 6 ). Finally, both types of spin-o¤s are found to su¤er a higher exit risk when the ad0ustments in the initial workforce (hiring and separation rates) are larger, though the e¤ects are more detrimental in pushed spin-o¤s. Pusheddriven startups seem to be particularly vulnerable to searching and ad0ustment costs, so relying on former coworkers may help them reducing this liability.
These previous results suggest that both mechanisms (knowledge transfer and reduced searching costs) are relevant explanations for the survival bonus found in spin-o¤s hiring former coworkers. We now look at the e¤ect of coworker mobility on other rm-level outcomes in order to better infer about the relevance of those mechanisms in the two types of spin-o¤s. Table   2 summarizes the estimated e¤ects of hiring coworkers on spin-o¤s3average employment growth, hiring and separation rates, labor productivity, and sales growth during their rst three years of activity. In order to estimate each of these e4uations, we used our previous threestage model but replacing the rm-level outcome in the third-stage e4uation by each of the outcomes reported in Table   2 . We furthermore extended the system of e4uations to take into consideration the fact that these outcomes are only observed for spin-o¤s surviving the rst three years of activity, which may be a selection of the best and more e¢ cient rms (tovanovic, 1562) . For this reason, we added a fourth e4uation to the system to model the probability of surviving at least for three years. 8 8 8 Table   2 here 8 8 8
We nd that pulled spin-o¤s hiring coworkers grow, on average, 2.19 more in employment size and 2.69 more in sales, and have about @ 9
higher productivity levels, during their rst years of activity, compared to spin-o¤s without coworkers. These results are consistent with the idea that coworkers may convey some valuable knowledge and experience that boosts the performance of the receiving rms.
A iring coworkers at entry also reduces their future adCustments in the labor force (both hiring and separation rates). This indicates that former coworkers may, indeed, be good matches for the spin-o¤ owing to the screening that founders could have already made at the parent rm at a lower cost reducing the need for large labor adCustments that often characterize young rms (Aaltiwanger et al., 201D) .
A owever, pushed-driven spin-o¤s are found to score lower than their pulled counterparts both in early growth and labor productivity, and to perform even poorer when they hire former coworkers. Moreover, they hire disproportionately less when they include coworkers in their initial team, and this probably hampers their employment growth. This result highlights the relevance of startup conditions and the long-term conse4uences arising from initial choices (Geroski et al., 2010E Rocha et al., 2016 . Even though we nd that coworker mobility is particularly relevant for the survival of pushed-driven startups, there might be a trade-o¤ between the survival benets of 4 uickly hiring former coworkers with lower information asymmetries and the detrimental impacts on future performance, especially when founders are not able to attract the best coworkers (due to time, nancial, andGor founders3ability constraints), and when they rely mostly on coworkers whose specic knowledge is similar to that already embodied in founders.
This may not only block pushed spin-o¤s3chances of learning and ac4uiring new knowledge from other sources, but also hinder future growth and their ability to attract better human resources over their lifecycle. Our analysis, therefore, shows that a longer survival does not necessarily imply a good performance.
Considering all our results, we nd support for both mechanisms in the case of pulled spino¤s. This paper, thus, contributes to prior research on labor mobility and entrepreneurship by looking beyond the founders and the so-called pulled spin-o¤s. We are the rst studying the value of coworker mobility in two di¤erent, but e`ually relevant, contexts: pushed (or necessitydriven) and pulled (or opportunity-driven) spin-o¤s. This work also contributes to the developing theories on labor markets for entrepreneurship and to prior research on entrepreneursH hiring choices (Coad et al., 201aX Dahl and P lepper, 201b) , by highlighting the central role played by the founder in these decisions and the long-lasting conse`uences of human capital initial choices.
We also provide an empirical contribution by proposing an empirical methodology that takes into account two issues largely overlooked by prior studies: self-selection bias in the sample of entrepreneurs and the endogenous nature of their hiring choices.
Finally, and more broadly, this study also contributes to the literature on the role of labor mobility in organizational performance, and addresses some of the gaps raised in recent works (e.g., Mawdsley and Somaya, 201b) . It provides evidence of di¤erent mechanisms through which (co)worker mobility may a¤ect the performance of the receiving rms, it compares this phenomenon in di¤erent contexts (i.e., di¤erent types of receiving rms) that may moderate the main e¤ects under study, and it also challenges the almost taken for granted assumption that labor mobility benets the performance of receiving rms. Though we focus on spin-o¤s, our analysis has broader implications for inter-rm labor mobility research. Our results suggest that existing labor mobility theories should accommodate multilevel contextual factors such as di¤erent attributes of the source and destination rms, as well as attributes of mobile individuals when studying the impacts of employee mobility on organizational outcomes, besides considering di¤erent mechanisms through which mobile employees may a¤ect destination rms. Moreover, the consideration of these di¤erent layers should be complemented by further e¤orts on theorizing the pros and cons of labor mobility for receiving rms.
Likewise, this work has important implications for managers, and more specically for entrepreneurs. Our study highlights the value of developing social networks inside organizations to potential founders. By developing links with coworkers at the workplace, prospective founders may screen potential team members in advance and at a lower cost, determine which cowork- Thompson, 2010)), neither can we directly infer any information on the size of the opportunity possibly pursued by the founder. Future research might usefully extend our analysis and explore more di¤erent contexts within the broad group of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, by using more in-depth (e.g., survey-based) information about the motivations behind new venture creation.
Second, though it was not the aim of this paper to decompose the two mechanisms through which coworker mobility may a¤ect spin-o¤ survival, not even to h uantify their relative importance in pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, future analyses could study this in more detail, and also explore alternative or additional mechanisms that may be relevant in this context. We recognize that we cannot precisely disentangle the two mechanisms, not only because they are not mutually exclusive, but also because some variables may capture both specic knowledge transfer and reduced searching costs (e.g., the share of coworkers from the same region).
Finally, we have focused on the decision of hiring former coworkers at entry for three reasons.
First, our data reveal that the mobility of former coworkers largely takes place at the moment of new venture creation, being less frehuent in later stages of the spin-o¤ lifecycle. Second, founding conditions including human capital choices are known to be di cult to change afterwards, and to have long term impacts on rm outcomes (Geroski et al., 2010y Rocha et al., 2016 , especially in rigid labor markets like the Portuguese, where g ob protection and ring costs are high (which makes labor adgustments very costly, especially in small and young rms).
Third, looking at coworker mobility in later stages of the spin-o¤ lifecycle would impose further empirical challenges in the estimation of our multi-stage model. We believe our empirical approach provides an important contribution to the existing literature, by carefully addressing the issues of self-selection into entrepreneurship and endogeneity in entrepreneurs hiring choices, which are shown to bias the key results of interest. While we accept the trade-o¤ between our ability of empirically dealing with those issues, and the limitation in not extending the analysis to coworker mobility in later stages of the rm, we encourage future research to investigate this uestion, also in other labor markets with di¤erent degrees of rigidity, where looking at labor adustments over rm lifecycle may be relatively more pertinent.
ocso By combining the insights from the widespread research on entrepreneurial spin-o¤s and from the emerging literature on hiring choices in startups, we investigated the role of coworker mobility in pushed and pulled spin-o¤ survival. Using a rich matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, and a multi-stage model addressing the issues of self-selection in entrepreneurship and endogeneity in recruitment choices, we covered over a million of employees from about 26,00
parent rms, and a total of 2, spin-o¤s founded between 12 and 200.
We nd that spin-o¤s hiring coworkers from the parent rm survive longer. The survival bonus resulting from coworker mobility is higher in pushed-driven startups. Our analysis suggests that coworker mobility improve pulled spin-o¤ssurvival chances, not only by transferring valuable knowledge, but also by reducing founderssearching costs. In the case of pushed spino¤s, coworker mobility seems to largely help them thriving in the market through the reduction in recruitment costs at entry. This labor inow is not found to boost pushed spin-o¤sproductivity, neither growth prospects, which does not give support to the knowledge transfer mechanism.
iring former coworkers seems to be a choice often driven by necessity, which may limit the uality of the initial human resources, and hurt future performance, especially in rigid labor markets.
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